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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Necessity of thesis 
Continuous integration and security testing are trendy topics in software industry at 
the moment. They are both important aspects of software development but only 
rarely brought together. This thesis focuses on how to integrate automatic security 
testing into a project´s continuous integration processes. Goal of this study is to un-
derstand the benefits of different kinds of security controls in a continuous integra-
tion pipeline.  
According to Stuttard and Pinto (2011, 1) stakes are high with web application secu-
rity. Users trust web applications with their own sensitive information, and mean-
while criminals are trying to compromise payment details. Reputation plays a critical 
role in this area of business.  
1.2 Structure of thesis 
The introductory chapter presents the theories related to the thesis. The second 
chapter presents the problem that the thesis discusses, and how analysis for current 
situation in the example projects was done. It also includes a mitigation plan for risks 
found in the analysis. After that there is security control implementation that goes 
through of different actions that were taken. Security controls and threats are com-
pared, and finally there are chapters for personnel education and a retrospective 
questionnaire on how things were felt in example projects.  
1.3 Commissioner 
Solita is a Finnish digital business consulting and services company. Solita is develop-
ing new business and digital services for private and public sector customers. Solita 
had around 400 workers in 2015 and has earned 6th place in the Great Place to Work 
Finland, medium-sized businesses ranking in the same year.  
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1.4 Continuous integration 
Continuous integration has been a driving idea for software development lately. The 
core idea behind continuous integration is to merge all developer work on a software 
project multiple times a day. To be able to forecast the quality of the merge there 
must be different stages of building, testing and deployment of code. To keep this cy-
cle time efficient there must be many levels of automation. This thesis will focus on 
how to add web security test automation into that cycle. 
Developing good software is to consistently follow good practices regardless of the 
chosen technologies. Continuous integration entails automation of some good prac-
tices. Integrating code multiple times a day will reduce the risks on a project when 
tests and inspections are run. Defects are easier to detect when they are introduced, 
and it is more expensive to fix them the later they are noticed. Continuous integra-
tion will also make the health of software to be measurable, which makes it possible 
to govern the maintainability of software. Another important point is that with build-
ing and testing in a clean environment continual basis assumptions are reduced. As-
sumptions are tedious since wrong assumptions are actually introducing a bug. With 
continuous integration repetitive processes are also reduced since processes are run 
in the same way every time. One of the main ideas of the continuous integration is 
also to make software deployable anytime which makes it cheaper and faster to get 
new features live. (Duvall, P. M., Matyas, S. and Glover 2007, 23-31) 
In this thesis Jenkins is used as a continuous integration and continuous delivery ap-
plication. Jenkins is a cross-platform application that is widely used. Jenkins can be 
used for a wide variety of languages and technologies, including .NET, Ruby, Groovy, 
Grails, PHP and Java. Jenkins has a low learning curve and will fit for the teams of all 
sizes. Jenkins has also hundreds of plugins for e.g. version control systems, build 
tools, code quality metrics and build notifiers. (Smart, J. F. 2011, 3-4) 
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1.5 Web application security testing 
Security testing is done to reveal security flaws in software projects by validating and 
verifying the effectiveness of application security controls. Vulnerability in web appli-
cation can be weakness in system design, implementation, operation or manage-
ment. (Meucci, M. and Muller, A. 2014, 27) 
OWASP testing framework is separated to five different phases Figure 1 presents 
these five phases of secure development lifecycle process as a continuum.  
 
Figure 1 - Secure development life cycle (Meucci, M. and Muller, A. 2014, 12) 
Before the development begins the development team should review policies and 
standards that they can follow during the deployment phase. This helps the team to 
face typical situations later on. During the design phase the team should make sure 
that they need to consider security mechanisms like user management, authentica-
tion, confidentiality and transport security. During development the team should 
make code reviews against a set of checklists containing common vulnerabilities, 
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known framework issues, industry specific requirements and business requirements 
for confidentiality, integrity and availability. In the deployment phase the team 
should carry out penetration testing and configuration management testing against 
the deployed application to ensure that it was deployed securely. Once the system 
has gone live the security testing should not stop there; instead, during maintenance 
and operations phases there must be health checks, change verifications and regres-
sions tests setup for the system. Figure 2 presents how different actions are spread 
into different phases of secure development lifecycle. (Meucci, M. and Muller, A. 
2014, 24-26) 
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Figure 2 - OWASP Testing framework workflow (Meucci, M. and Muller, A. 2014, 26) 
This thesis focuses especially on development and deployment phases of the OWASP 
testing framework. Yet many of the security controls introduced in this thesis can be 
used in other phases of the testing framework.  
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1.6 Continuous delivery and deployment pipeline 
Continuous delivery focuses on getting new features for end users as soon as they 
are implemented and tested. Deployment pipeline consists of various tools that help 
to meet the delivery for the customer. By adding metrics to the equation; develop-
ment team can find parts of pipeline that are not working efficiently or are unneces-
sary and do not provide any value.  (Lehtonen, T., Suonsyrjä, S., Kilamo, T. and Mikko-
nen, T., 1-3) 
Deployment pipeline metrics can be divided into two categories: implementation 
level and pipeline level. Deployment pipeline analyses how long it takes to develop a 
feature, to deploy it and to get it into use. Pipeline level instead calculates how many 
features the team can deliver to the end user per month. Figure 3 presents how dif-
ferent metrics are molded into feature branch driven development pipeline. (Lehto-
nen, T., Suonsyrjä, S., Kilamo, T. and Mikkonen, T., 9-11) 
 
Figure 3 - Pipeline and development level metrics in feature branch driven pipeline 
(Lehtonen, T., Suonsyrjä, S., Kilamo, T. and Mikkonen, T. 7) 
This thesis is interested in implementation level metrics of the deployment pipeline. 
Web application security testing can be a burdensome task if done manually. Security 
and code quality aspects will effect both development and deployment time.  
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1.7 DevOps 
DevOps is about managing infrastructure as code. Nowadays infrastructure needs to 
be reproducible and testable quickly and repeatable, which means that an identical 
environment is needs be built up multiple times on continuous basis. This includes 
running virtual machines to shield runtime environment, automation of configura-
tion for the virtual machine and monitoring tools to ensure that environments are 
running properly. Fault tolerance environments needs to be distributed and in cloud 
environment scaling has to be done on demand. (Loukides, M. 2012)  
Web application security testing and continuous integration are tightly coupled with 
DevOps. In DevOps the configuration can be changed and multiple different varia-
tions of environments built up. Still all the environments needs to be secure thus se-
curity testing is needed in the process. This means that security testing automation 
has to be part of the DevOps and also monitoring naturally has also links to security 
too. Environment and its use dictates how heavily it needs to be monitored. This the-
sis is interested in deploying a web application into a web server and making sure 
that the environment from network level to application binaries is secure to use.  
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
2.1 Defense in depth model for .NET development 
Onion model of defense in depth was changed to match the development perspec-
tive more. The end result was a pyramid structure as described in Figure 4 that co-
vers network, host, application server, application, configuration and code.  
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Figure 4 - Defense in depth model from .NET development perspective 
In production environment there always has to be a network from where users can 
connect to an application. There must also be a host to be base for the application 
server that actually runs the application. The application always has configuration 
and code. To restrict malicious users from impacting business related application 
parts, any of these six layers can be used as a restrictive layer to forbid access fur-
ther.   
One could argue that data needs to be on top of the pyramid; however it has been 
left out for now. The only security controls that can be set on data level are authori-
zation and encryption and both can be checked with unit tests in continuous integra-
tion so the data layer is not needed in this scenario. 
2.2 Threats from OWASP Top 10 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a non-profit organization that 
is based on volunteering. OWASP is dedicated to helping companies to develop, pur-
chase and maintain secure applications. OWASP Top 10 threats is based on 500 000 
vulnerabilities across many organizations and applications. The threats that have 
been brought on the list have been measured from perspective of exploitability, de-
tectability and impact estimations. 
Code
Config
Application
Application server
Host
Network
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On top of the OWASP Top 10 list is a threat called injection, which means that at-
tacker can include in commands or queries into input data and will trick the system 
into executing unintended commands. Maybe the most common of this type of 
threats is SQL injection where malicious user may be able to fetch an unlimited 
amount of data from the database. 
The second on the list is broken authentication and session management threat. This 
means that it is common that applications may leak passwords to malicious users or 
malicious users may be able to steal legitimate users´ session tokens and act on 
someone else’s identity.  
The third on the list is Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). XSS is a flaw where an application 
will take user input and send it back to web browser without proper validation or es-
cape mechanisms. This allows attackers to run malicious scripts on someone else’s 
web browser or redirect users into attacker’s malicious website.  
The fourth on the list is insecure direct object reference, which means that an appli-
cation or application server does not have proper access control over implementa-
tion objects, files and folders. This lets attacker to change parameter value to directly 
refer instead of correct system object another system object, which leads to attacker 
being able to compromise data from the server. 
The fifth on the list is security misconfiguration. This one is pretty generic since it co-
vers configuration on operating systems, web servers, database servers, application 
itself and application frameworks. Depending on what was misconfigured the user 
can compromise that part of the system or the whole system. 
The sixth on the list is sensitive data exposure. Sensitive data e.g. credit cards, iden-
tity information and authentication credentials must be protected with extra caution. 
Many web applications fail to do this. Attacker can steal or modify weakly protected 
data. 
The seventh on the list is missing function level access control. Web applications 
need to verify user’s right to access function on server side when privileged function 
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is called. If there is no verification then attackers can forge requests and possibly gain 
access to details that they are not permitted to.  
Number eight on the list is Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Attackers force a 
logged-on user to send a HTTP request to a vulnerable web application. This forged 
request needs to contain victim’s authentication information. Attacker then makes 
victims browser to generate requests for the vulnerable application trusted by that 
application because they are generated from a legitimate user´s browser. 
The ninth on the list is using components with known vulnerabilities. Application 
servers, modules, libraries, framework and software can have known vulnerabilities, 
which make it possible for attacker to exploit such a known vulnerability which then 
may lead to any result depending of the type of the vulnerability.  
The tenth on the list are unvalidated redirects and forwards. Some sites for example 
can take URL as a parameter where to redirect after login has occurred. If this param-
eter is not sanitized the attacker can forge any URL into request and redirect victims 
to malicious websites. (OWASP Top 10 – 2013, 1-6) 
2.3 Threats from Cloud Security Alliances Notorious Nine 
Cloud security alliance is a non-profit organization which tries to promote the use of 
best practices from security perspective within cloud computing to ensure security in 
cloud. CSA has published a list of top threats in cloud computing which is called “No-
torious nine”.  
The first on the list are data breaches. In multitenant cloud environment the risks for 
data breaches are higher because of wider attack vector. In addition to traditional se-
curity risks cloud also introduces hypervisor level vulnerabilities that means that one 
virtual machine on same physical server might be able to extract information from 
another virtual machine. Also, a design flaw in SaaS can make it possible to leak infor-
mation from one customer to another. What makes this even worse is that in special 
kind of cloud environment competitors might share the same SaaS application which 
means that they might leak their information directly to their competitor. (Cloud Se-
curity Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 2013, 8). 
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The second on the list is data loss. In addition to traditional threats like malicious at-
tackers and natural disasters, cloud introduces new ways to lose data. Because of 
multitenancy a greater deal of information is encrypted on the cloud. Losing the en-
cryption key may lead to loss of data. Losing credentials for cloud service manage-
ment may also lead to tremendous amount of data loss, which happened to a jour-
nalist of Wired magazine: he lost all data he had in his Apple, Gmail and Twitter ac-
counts. This threat also is present in each service model: IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. (Cloud 
Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 2013, 9). 
The third on the list is account or service traffic hijacking. The threat itself does not 
differ much from on-premises environments. Losing credentials is always a bad thing. 
The reason why this is especially threatening in a cloud environment is the gain the 
attacker will have. With stolen service account attacker can easily set up new ma-
chines for botnets or obfuscate his true identity when attacking some other party. 
Two-factor authentication is strongly advised for mitigating this threat. 
(Cloud Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 2013, 
10). 
The fourth on the list are insecure interfaces and APIs. Cloud computing provides a 
set of APIs their customers are using to interact with the cloud services. Customers 
are creating new environment, creating credentials, monitoring their environments 
and doing this all through APIs. A vulnerability in these APIs can have a huge impact 
on the cloud service. Cloud service provider might even need to take the whole cloud 
infrastructure down if they cannot be sure what legitimate requests are and what 
not. It is also important for the customers that they understand the seriousness of 
securing these APIs with strong credentials, encryption and multifactor authentica-
tion. (Cloud Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 
2013, 12). 
The fifth on the list is Denial of Service (DOS). While cloud environment has scaling 
capacities to mitigate the threat it also provides new problems into this domain. Suc-
cessful DOS attack will cut all possibilities to manage the service since customer 
might not be able to even connect the system since the DOS has brought it down. 
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With automatic scaling the cloud service can also start to reserve so many resources 
that the bill for a customer rises in magnitudes. The problem in this situation is that 
the ability to cut out the attacker is limited. (Cloud Security Alliance The Notorious 
Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 2013, 14). 
The sixth on the list are malicious insiders. Malicious insiders are always a serious 
threat but the malicious insider with system administrator rights in cloud environ-
ments might be able to hijack or destroy all your environments in few clicks. (Cloud 
Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 2013, 16).  
The seventh on the list is abuse of cloud services. This threat is about the fact that 
buying hardware for brute forcing encryption might be expensive. A cloud platform 
for that is most likely much cheaper, which interests malicious cloud users to harness 
the power of cloud to malicious use which leads cloud service providers into a situa-
tion where they need to have strict policies for legitimate usage. Cloud service pro-
vides will also need to detect this kind of activity which most likely leads to monitor-
ing of cloud customers. (Cloud Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud compu-
ting Top Threats in 2013, 18). 
Number eight on the list is insufficient due diligence. Moving from internal network 
to cloud environment might lead customers into a situation where their applications 
will no longer meet the security criteria they met before because of missing internal 
network-level security controls. Customers need to understand the cloud service pro-
vider´s environment thoroughly; otherwise they might take risks of unknown level in 
their cloud implementation. (Cloud Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud com-
puting Top Threats in 2013, 19).  
The ninth on the list are shared technology vulnerabilities. Compromise in any shared 
technology level such as hypervisor or SaaS application exposes multiple customers 
to threat. Single vulnerability or misconfiguration could possible take down the cloud 
service provider´s cloud infrastructure, which means that in a cloud both customers 
and cloud service provides must have a defense in-depth strategy to minimize the 
impact from such vulnerability. (Cloud Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud 
computing Top Threats in 2013, 21). 
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In this thesis cloud is not a key topic; nevertheless, many of these threats affect soft-
ware development since it might not be up to developer´s decision if the application 
is hosted in the cloud or not. Instead, developers are in the key position in making 
sure that their application meets the security needs for cloud services.  
2.4 Overview of projects 
Two projects were measured for this thesis. Both were public projects with the same 
kind of demand for security. Servers were hosted on the third party servers and 
there were no money transfers on the website. Both projects were given a security 
questionnaire (Appendix 1) to measure the starting level of the security testing.  
First project 
No security testing was implemented on the project and there was no guidance for 
secure development available. Project security requirements were not felt to be 
strict but rather very loose. Project members were quite happy about the situation 
and did not want to add any security automation into their project. The project was 
.NET CMS solution built in on top of EPiServer CMS for a rather large company.  
Second project 
The second project had security testing implemented by a third party. Nevertheless, 
the security testing report was not public information in the project, and it was not 
shown to all project members. Project members felt confident about fitting into cus-
tomer’s security policy; however, they were unhappy about the level of security test-
ing and its automation. Project was .NET CMS solution built in on top of EPiServer 
CMS for a rather large company. 
Summary of questionnaire 
It was clear from the answers that no security testing had been done in the projects. 
The feelings about need of security were mixed. The first project team reflected that 
it needs none, and it felt that their customer was not that interested. The second 
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project felt that they need a higher level of security and they felt that they had a dis-
appointing level of testing done; however on the other hand they felt that their level 
of security matches their customer’s security policies.  
Hosting 
For both projects an external party is responsible for hosting business, which means 
that there is no control over network from Solita. On host Solita has only limited con-
trol and should not do any installations or upgrades without permission. The applica-
tion server itself is more a responsibility of a hosting partner; Solita’s responsibility is 
to configure it for the application, which means that the study is not very interested 
in network, host or application server level security since there is limited or no con-
trol over them.  
Risk analysis 
Brief analysis showed that the example projects were similar to each other. Both 
were CMS systems published on open internet. There was no sensitive data in the 
system, and the parts of the system demanding authentication were for content edi-
tors and administrators. This simplified the threat modeling since both projects were 
just websites among others. Most likely he threat agents would be script kiddies, 
bots or disappointed customers. The business impact for the site was more or less a 
strike against the brand, and no actual money flow would be affected. Based on this 
the risk analysis was done on a technical basis. (See Figure 5)  
 
Figure 5 - Web application security risk factors (OWASP Top 10 – 2013, 5) 
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It was measured that the major risks in the security testing in both projects where 
somewhat the same. There was no guidance for developers available, no internal se-
curity testing done, and the threat modeling had not been done; thus both projects 
were lacking security testing automation.  
The OWASP TOP 10 from 2013 were used as a threat reference.   
3 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
3.1 Plan for mitigating the risks 
The plan to mitigate the risks can be divided into three types of actions. 
1. Embrace the security perspective in project steering 
2. Implement technical security controls  
3. Educate personnel 
It was clear that there was not enough security testing done in the projects. The per-
sonnel were aware of security threats; however in the project they were not maybe 
treated as seriously as they could have been. The first step to take would be to make 
the project steering personnel to put effort on managing the security on the project. 
Getting the support of the steering committee makes it relatively easy to get budget 
for implementing security controls in place. Last but not least, the personnel has to 
be educated to understand what kind of threats modern web applications are facing.  
3.2 Controls for risk mitigation 
Focusing on technical controls building on top of the continuous integration the big-
gest risks facing web applications are user inputs. This is in top of OWASP Top 10 list 
(OWASP TOP 10, 2013, 6) called as injection. The majority of the security controls 
tries to mitigate or at least narrow that risk. Some of the other risks in OWASP Top 
10 list are also exploited via user inputs or fake inputs, e.g. insecure direct object ref-
erence and XSS vulnerability. Some of the other risks are hard to control via auto-
mated scripts since they are more related to architectural decisions. For example, 
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missing function level control and sensitive data exposure are hard to notice with 
scripts since it is hard to say what sensitive data is and how function level user access 
should be from automated perspective. Instead, these decisions should be reviewed 
in projects together with customer and development team.  
3.3 Requirements for tools 
Toolset for the study was done by finding out what kind of tools are available at the 
market. There is plenty of tools available, which lead to need to limit the number of 
controls studied. Technical security controls had few requirements that needed to be 
filled for study.  
Tool needs to run in Windows environment without too much effort 
Tool needs to be attachable to Jenkins (has a Jenkins plugin or command-line 
interface) 
Tool needs to be suitable for .NET C# projects (native Microsoft environment 
tool or easily installable on Windows) 
Tool needs to be cheap or a great value for money 
With these requirements in mind, a great deal of possible security tools were cut out.  
4 SECURITY CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION  
4.1 Education 
The company has decided to have mandatory OWASP TOP 10 education for all of its 
personnel. It is advised that the personnel goes through this education every two 
years to keep up to date with current security demands. There has been this kind of 
education also earlier but it has not been mandatory and it has not been ongoing.  
With this action it should be easier for the project personnel to understand security 
threats they are facing and to create threat modeling for their project. Derived from 
understanding and threat modeling, it should be straightforward to also communi-
cate with customers about their security policies and threat modeling.  
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From threat modeling it is also possible to continue into planning security controls 
that would mitigate risks from threat modeling.  
4.2 Static code analysis with FxCop 
4.2.1 Choosing the FxCop 
FxCop is Microsoft application designed for code analysis. FxCop contains multiple 
rules, and Microsoft has provided multiple preset rule sets for it. The reason to 
choose FxCop was simply its easiness to integrate into solution. It is basically one 
click from the Visual Studio and it is present in both CI and local builds.  
4.2.2 Implementing static code analysis with FxCop 
Despite the various rule sets, none of them really fit the project needs therefore it 
was decided to plan a rule set of one’s own for the project. The problem with the 
original rule sets is that they test various other things as well in addition to security. 
Some of the checks, e.g. checking property naming convention for right usage of Eng-
lish plural can be really frustrating when there is a huge amount of false positives 
that will not actually affect the application in any way. Since each rule can be cherry-
picked as its own into FxCop rule set it is a wise thing to do to study the rule set and 
pick those that best fit the need. There are two actions to choose for rule: warning 
and error. If there is something that really should not happen then error should be 
used. If there is fear that there might be a huge amount of false positives it is sug-
gested to use warning. Figure 6 presents how easy it is to enable code analysis in the 
project. 
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Figure 6 - FxCop is so easy to enable that it is plain stupidity to not to use it 
4.2.3 Using static code analysis with FxCop 
In the build server needs to have full installation of Visual Studio to get the right bi-
naries there, or another way around is to copy a great deal of code analysis DLLs into 
path where Jenkins can find them during build. 
If there is no “treat warnings as errors” option on the project then the actual warning 
on CI will not affect a single thing unless users are gathering information about the 
amount of warnings. It is stupid to not to handle warnings; therefore, treating warn-
ings as errors would be wise thing to do if a suitable rule set for can be found. Treat-
ing warning as errors will stop compiling the project and fail the whole CI build. That 
is good since that means that the developers that created bad code in the first place 
will get notified of failed build, and the application with bad code in it will not even 
go into the test environment.  
4.3 Static code analysis with VisualCodeGrepper 
4.3.1 Choosing the VisualCodeGrepper 
VisualCodeGrepper was found by accident when trying to figure out different static 
code analyses to the .NET. It is an open source project and is available at 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/visualcodegrepp/. It tries to be a tool that does not 
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return many false positives and is able to search intelligently for bad code or com-
ments that are stating that the code below might not be ready. It was chosen to 
study because it fulfilled the main requirements.  
4.3.2 Implementing script for continuous integration 
The basic script for VCG was really easy to implement. There was a need only for set-
ting few command line parameters to the script. The harder part occurred when get-
ting the results into a format that was understood by CI build server. Unit test results 
in jUnit format were chosen, and the mapping was conducted with PowerShell func-
tion from one XML format to another.  
4.3.3 Using VisualCodeGrepper in continuous integration 
After the initial plumping was done it was straightforward to get the tool into use in 
CI build server. Of course the tool had to be installed into the server and Jenkins 
needed PowerShell plugin for running the script. Figure 7 presents how the example 
script was integrated into Jenkins build.  
 
Figure 7 - Using VisualCodeGrepper in CI Build 
4.4 Static code analysis with ReSharper command line tools 
4.4.1 Choosing the ReSharper command line tools 
ReSharper is a product of JetBrains. It can be integrated into Visual Studio where it 
immediately tells developer about the problems in his code without even building 
the code. ReSharper is really commonly used with Visual Studio and it has also com-
mand line tools available. The command line tools that were studied were In-
spectcode.exe and DupFinder.exe. InspectCode.exe is able to make the static code 
analysis on a given solution. In addition to another static code analysis tools, it is able 
to scan also .js and .css files for problems, whereas DupFinder.exe is a tool for finding 
duplicated code in the solution.    
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4.4.2 Implementing ReSharper command line tools analysis for continuous 
integration 
There is no actual Jenkins plugin for ReSharper command line tools available. The 
tool itself is relatively easy to run from command line in Jenkins build by just typing 
inspectcode.exe mysolution.sln /o=C:\Temp\inspecresults.xml or dupfinder.exe 
mysolution.sln /o=C:\Temp\dupresults.xml. The problem is with getting information 
out of the tools. Jenkins does not support either of the output xml file format and if 
users are willing to use them in Jenkins they most likely need to transform them into 
some other valid format as it was done with VisualCodeGrepper. 
4.4.3 Using ReSharper command line tools in continuous integration 
The actual usage of ReSharper command line tools was skipped since there was a 
plugin in SonarQube to integrate these tools there. Look for chapter 4.5 about So-
narQube illustrates how ReSharper command line tools was integrated into Jenkins 
and SonarQube.   
4.5 Static code analysis with SonarQube 
4.5.1 Choosing the SonarQube 
According to Campbell and Papapetrou (2013), SonarQube is a free open source code 
quality platform. It is able to produce moment-in-time snapshots of code quality as 
well as trending indicators. It does not only show what is wrong but it also provides 
quality-management tools, integration to Jenkins and plugins for code quality tools. 
SonarQube measures code quality against following seven axes: 
Potential bugs 
Coding rules 
Tests 
Duplications 
Comments 
Architecture and design 
Complexity 
It was an easy decision to try SonarQube out. It surely fit met the requirements well.  
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4.5.2 Implementing SonarQube analysis for continuous integration 
The actual implementing process was slightly heavier compared to many other con-
tinuous security controls because a whole new platform actually needed to be in-
stalled for code quality measurement. Following steps were needed before So-
narQube was successfully installed 
Installing SonarQube (the platform itself) 
Installing SonarQube-runner for MSBuild (tool that gathers analysis report) 
Installing Jenkins plugin for SonarQube 
Configuration Jenkins plugin for SonarQube 
Configuration of SonarQube itself 
Installing plugins to SonarQube (MSBuild, FxCop and ReShaper command line 
tools) 
Configuration of Resharper command line tool usage 
After all the initial plumping was done it was possible to actually configure a build 
that sent information to SonarQube. The build setup consists of four phases which 
are illustrated in Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11. 
 
Figure 8 - Setting up SonarQube analysis 
 
Figure 9- Building the application with MSBuild for SonarQube 
 
Figure 10 - Running ReSharper command line tools for SonarQube 
 
Figure 11 - Telling the SonarQube to finish the analysis 
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Luckily there was a good blog post about the setup in the internet:   
http://www.happiestminds.com/blogs/how-to-set-up-sonar-on-jenkins-for-net-pro-
jects/ 
Before everything was ready for the build one last thing was needed - to disable CSS 
files checks from ReSharper command line tools. Without this action the build pro-
cess hanged to the CSS file checks for too long a time.   
4.5.3 Using SonarQube in continuous integration 
The hard work paid off.  The setup was finished and after the build was initiated in 
Jenkins; a fancy dashboard was shown in SonarQube. (See Figure 12)  
 
Figure 12 - SonarQube dashboard 
Dashboard gives an ability to go deeper into every detail and inspect what it consists 
of. Technical debt ratio might seem huge in this figure; however it should be remem-
bered that the amount of issues is a sum of three different tools with pretty much 
everything turned on. There is most likely some fine tuning to be done to cut un-
wanted results from showing. It is also easy to disagree with the ratings of the issues 
that the tool has brought up. The initial debt ratio for the project was 0.4% when 
only SonarQube’s own analysis were set on. This means that FxCop and ReSharper 
command line tools brought a huge deal of issues on the board.  
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4.6 Calculating code metrics 
4.6.1 Choosing the Code Metrics 
Code Metrics is a functionality of Visual Studio that let developer to calculate cy-
clomatic complexity, class coupling, depth of inheritance, lines of code and maintain-
ability of code. The results are shown from root level where user can dig deeper into 
classes or even functions to see where the complexity is coming from in the solution. 
Code Metrics is built-in tool so it is quite easy to test, and therefore it was given a try.  
4.6.2 Implementing Code Metrics for continuous integration 
Implementing Code Metrics into Jenkins was easy. Downloading a plugin and config-
uring few things was straightforward. After that Jenkins build configuration needed 
to know which code metrics tool use, what the assembly files are to investigate and 
where to output the results (See Figure 13 and 14). The results were afterwards 
given to a report tool which drew a result set to the build instance about its metrics.  
 
Figure 13 - Configuration of Code Metrics into Jenkins build 
 
Figure 14 - Setting up the report from the Code Metrics calculation 
4.6.3 Using Code Metrics in continuous integration 
After setting up the build configuration and building the project a graph and an inter-
active table appeared on the project. (See Figure 15 and 16) 
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Figure 15 - Code Metrics graph 
 
Figure 16 - Code Metrics result set 
4.7 Web application security testing with OWASP Zed Attack 
Proxy 
4.7.1 Choosing the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy 
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy is an open-source web application security scanner. Why it 
was chosen was its JSON API which makes it possible to control the web application 
security testing from CI as scripts. Choosing a web application security scanner into 
the project makes it easy to test security vulnerabilities, although security testers 
should always remember that there is no one tool that suits all purposes but instead 
there should be multiple tools in a toolbox.  
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4.7.2 Implementing script for continuous integration 
OWASP ZAP presented an API that could be used with scripts in CI; but the script 
needed to be implemented. It was decided to create it as a PowerShell module due 
to the synergies with the .NET platform. It is publicly available at GitHub 
https://github.com/solita/powershell-zap.  
The module consists of following aspects:  
1. Configure the environment (e.g. where OWASP ZAP is and where to store re-
sults) 
2. Ensure that OWASP ZAP is running as daemon, if it is not it must be started 
3. Set scanning policies for web application security testing 
4. Spider the site with normal spider and then with AJAX spider to get the whole 
attack surface available 
5. Make vulnerability scanning against the attack surface 
6. Save report 
7. Clean up spider and scanning current data 
8. Stop the daemon 
In the example there are two spidering examples because the example projects were 
using JavaScript so heavily that normal spidering would not have worked well 
enough. AJAX spidering is able to execute JavaScript thus follow links that would not 
be available without JavaScript execution. Scanning is straightforward as in OWASP 
ZAP current state.  
Saving the report was relatively complicated. The Jenkins build needed to have some 
kind of results in to be shown from example radiator, which means that there was a 
need to translate the normal scanning results into a format that the CI server would 
understand. jUnit was chosen as format for the results. 
4.7.3 Using OWASP Zed Attack Proxy in continuous integration 
There are some points that might make it burdensome to use web application secu-
rity scanning in continuous integration. First of all user has to be sure that spidering 
is effective enough; otherwise parts of the application will not be scanned. Another 
reason is that there might be false positives, and the user will then need to create 
some kind of blacklist to disable those warnings. The third reason is that the transfor-
mation from scan results to unit test results works better for some warnings than for 
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others. The reason for that is that the most crucial information in scan results might 
be in a different field depending on the type of the warning.  
 
4.8 Configuration analyses with Microsoft Baseline Security Ana-
lyzer 
4.8.1 Choosing MBSA 
Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer is able to check the status of operating system 
updates, Microsoft Data Access Components, Microsoft XML Parser, .NET Framework 
and SQL Server. It is also able to scan for IIS and SQL administrative vulnerabilities in 
the configuration. (“How To : Use the Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer, 2015”). 
4.8.2 Implementing configuration analyze with MBSA 
During the implementation phase of MBSA an error was faced that stopped testing. 
MBSA was launched from command line with mbsacli.exe; however it failed every 
time with “Fatal Error 1 while loading language”, which indicated that it might not be 
compatible with test setup and it was looked into no further in the study. 
4.9 Configuration analyses with Microsoft Baseline Configuration 
Analyzer 
4.9.1 Choosing MBCA 
This tool was found in some blog post with links to Microsoft download links. It was 
really odd that other information about the tool could not be found except the help 
it had inside itself. It seems that this might have been deprecated long time ago. Yet 
it was decided to give a try since it was Microsoft tool and it covered configuration 
analysis which was interesting topic.  
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4.9.2 Implementing configuration analyze with MBCA 
During implementation phase of MBCA a problem was faced that stopped testing. 
MBCA can be launched from PowerShell by first importing BaselineConfigurationAna-
lyzer module. After import of BaselineConfigurationAnalyzer module Get-
MBCAModel cmdlet can be used for getting IDs for different kind of models. After 
getting models the scan can be started by piping one or multiple models to Invoke-
MBCAModel cmdlet. In the test setup MBCA had not installed any models and thus 
scanning could not be started.  
4.10 Configuration analyses with Attack Surface Analyzer 
4.10.1 Choosing ASA 
Attack surface analyzer is meant to be used in two phases. At first user should use 
ASA to get baseline of the computer by scanning it before installations. After initial 
report is ready a line-of-business application should be installed and a new scan 
started with attack surface analyzer. The attack surface analyzer can then compare 
the situation before and after the installation of the software and find out if there 
are any security risks involved in the product. This software has also command line 
interface so it can also be added into CI pipeline. It was not used in this study since 
there were no actual software installations involved in the CI process. 
4.11 Security scanning with Nessus 
Security scanning with Nessus has been done in other projects in Solita. Since the 
servers in the example projects were responsibility of third party it was decided that 
Nessus scanning is not implemented. Initial knowledge also stated that Nessus is not 
built for web application security testing in a manner that would help developers in 
their work. It is more of a toolss for checking that the whole environment is running 
in a safely manner.  
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4.12 Performance analyze with jMeter 
4.12.1 Choosing jMeter 
One of the vital perspectives of security was availability. If software has performance 
issues it is easier for hackers to create a denial of service attack. Thus, the perfor-
mance analysis can be thought as a security control as well. jMeter is a performance 
testing tool designed for performance measurements and load test functionalities. It 
has capabilities of multithreading and simulating simultaneous users in site. It does 
not do everything that a normal browser does, and thus its results are not absolute 
truths from end user perspective; however, they are still indicating how well a server 
is performing when having a multiple request on the site. By default jMeter does not 
interpret JavaScript, which has to be considered when planning the test, in single 
page-applications it is mandatory to either plug in a JavaScript interpreter or to call 
directly those API endpoints that JavaScript would be calling.  
4.12.2 Implementing jMeter performance analysis in continuous integration 
There is an example implementation for easy jMeter command line usage available 
in GitHub at https://github.com/dratini/jmeter-perfotrator. This jMeter-perfotrator 
project shows an example how to easily run jMeter from command line by using pre-
configured jmx-file and injecting URLs from a text file for a performance analysis. 
Running the tool is a one liner (calling the start-run.bat in project, see Figure 17) af-
ter setting up urls.txt in the project folder. 
 
Figure 17 - Example task how to run jMeter-perfotrator in Jenkins 
Results can be afterwards shown in Jenkins with Performance-plugin. (See Figure 18 
for plugin configuration) 
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Figure 18 - Jenkins Performance plugin configuration for jMeter 
Results.jtl file has been generated by jMeter-perfotrator.  
 
4.12.3 Using jMeter in continuous integration 
The plugin shows both trends and the actual data of the performance test results. 
Below are charts for throughput, responding time and error percentage.  
 
Figure 19 - jMeter trend chart in Jenkins with Performance plugin 
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5 COMPARISON OF CONTROLS AND RISKS 
5.1 Defense in depth onion model for .NET development 
Security controls are mapped on the matrix against defense in depth onion model 
and this was the result. 
Table 1. On what layers CI security controls are in defense in depth model 
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FxCop         Y Y 
VisualCodeGrepper         Y Y 
SonarQube     * * Y Y 
Code Metrics           Y 
OWASP ZAP     Y Y     
MBSA   Y Y       
ASA   Y Y       
Nessus Y Y Y Y     
jMeter     Y Y     
       
* SonarQube can import security scanning results from ThreadFix plugin 
which in turn is capable fo using multiple different web application scan-
ners 
 
There are few interesting issues on this spreadsheet. One is that there are actually no 
tools that would combine using an application and reading the code of the applica-
tion. SonarQube might be able to do that by having separated tools for scanning and 
static code analysis and having correlation done in third tool. There is clearly an open 
market area for a tool which would combine these two aspects.  
Another interesting issue is that clearly the source code, application server and appli-
cation itself were the most interesting topics with these tools. 
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5.2  OWASP TOP 10 threats 
OWASP TOP 10 threats (OWASP Top 10 – 2013) were written down and then esti-
mated it was estimated how well the tools would find vulnerabilities from each 
threat category. The results are indicited in Table 2 as follows:  
Table 2. How well CI security control mitigate OWASP TOP 10 threats 
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FxCop 1   1 1 1           
VisualCodeGrepper 1   1   1           
SonarQube 1   1 1 1           
Code Metrics                     
OWASP ZAP 2 2 2 2 2 1   2 1 2 
MBSA         2       2   
ASA           1         
Nessus 1 1 1 1 2 1   1 2 1 
jMeter                     
empty=no, 1=maybe, 2=meant for that       
 
The first interesting matter that jumped out from the results was that actually web 
application security scanners face the threats in OWASP TOP 10 best. Another inter-
esting issue was that the code analysis does not directly help with facing threats; 
they do it indirectly via sanitizing the code. Code quality metrics and performance 
monitoring were useless controls from OWASP TOP 10 threats perspective. Those did 
not help at all in facing threats. One more noteworthy fact was that the missing func-
tion level authorization was a threat that will not be controlled by any of these secu-
rity controls.  
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5.3 Cloud Security Alliances “Notorious nine” 
Cloud Security Alliances notorious nine is a less known threat list. It was brought up 
since cloud computing is trendy in IT business and many are still wondering about 
starting business in the cloud. CSA’s report introduces the common risks in cloud to 
help companies manage risks in cloud based solutions. Table 3 illustrates how well 
the introduced security controls do when facing cloud computing threats.  (Cloud Se-
curity Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 2013) 
Table 3 - How well CI security control mitigate the CSA´s Notorious Nine Threats 
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FxCop       1       1   
VisualCodeGrepper       1       1   
SonarQube       1       1   
Code Metrics               1   
OWASP ZAP 1     1       1   
MBSA 1             1   
ASA 1             1   
Nessus 1     1       1   
jMeter         1     1   
empty=no, 1=maybe, 2=meant for that      
 
From the estimation above can be seen that cloud computing top threats are hardly 
controlled with introduced security controls. All of the tools help with insufficient 
due diligence. Many help with preventing data breaches and securing interfaces and 
APIs. Finally, jMeter also found its purpose in the security control list. Its sole pur-
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pose is to make users familiar with bottlenecks and capability limitations of applica-
tions in performance. Denial of Service attacks in particular want to target heavy op-
erations to bring down applications.  
Many of the threats introduced by Cloud Security Alliance are threats that are con-
trolled more with policies and best practices in management than in application 
level. Detailed explanations how to control these threats can be found in CSA’s re-
port (Cloud Security Alliance The Notorious Nine: Cloud computing Top Threats in 
2013). 
5.4 OWASP Testing framework workflow 
OWASP Testing framework was introduced in introduction chapter. It is useful to un-
derstand how these different tools are linked into testing framework different 
phases to understand when they can be used.  
Table 4. In what phases in OWASP Testing framework the introduced CI security con-
trols are linked to 
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FxCop     x     
VisualCodeGrepper     x     
SonarQube     x     
Code Metrics     x     
OWASP ZAP     x x x 
MBSA       x x 
ASA       x   
Nessus       x x 
jMeter     x x x 
 
The table above clearly visualizes that none of these tools will help in initial stages of 
development where guidelines, policies and architectural decisions are preliminarily 
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made. In a product´s or project´s lifecycle there is no continuous integration pipeline 
before the development starts since there is nothing to be built.  
All the code analysis tools can be used only in development and deployment; they 
were present to verify the code quality - nothing less, nothing more, thus they are 
not present in deployment or maintenance. Checking the quality of the build is a cru-
cial part of the deployment.  
Attack Surface Analyzer is a tool that compares the configuration of a machine be-
fore and after installation. It is easily thought that it would be only present during de-
ployment; however, actually it can be used also as a health check tool to continu-
ously check that the environment will not change. Microsoft Baseline Security Ana-
lyzer can be used in the same manner. There is no use in development for these 
tools, since they are at their best to verify the quality assurance and production envi-
ronments.  
Nessus, OWASP ZAP and jMeter can be used in continuous security testing perspec-
tive to constantly check that no new vulnerabilities are found, and the software runs 
with the expected performance. OWASP ZAP and jMeter can be useful in the devel-
opment phase, Nessus most likely will not.  
6 PERSONNEL TRAINING 
6.1 Plan for educating people 
According to Erickson (2008, 5) understanding of programming helps those who ex-
ploit, and an understanding of exploitation helps those who program. Hacking is an 
act where a hacker tries to bypass security in ways programmer never intended the 
software to be used.  
Education is important part of the facing security threats in development. What 
should be done so that people were willing to use these security controls in their 
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projects? First they must make to understand the threats that a modern web applica-
tion will be facing. After that they understand the need and will listen more easily 
how to mitigate those threats in their projects. 
6.2 OWASP TOP 10  
From Solita’s perspective it is crucial to understand at least the most common 
threats for web applications. These are mentioned in the OWASP TOP 10 list. Solita 
has had a long tradition of educating people to know these threats and a continuous 
action to retrain employees from time to time. During this study it was decided that 
all new employees are required to go through OWASP TOP 10 training and all person-
nel should revisit the topic once every two years. This plan will keep these topics on 
the table and keep Solita’s employees alarmed about the ever-changing threats of 
cyber world.   
6.3 CI Security controls in .NET projects 
As an another end result of this study a training session was given to .NET developers 
of Solita about CI security controls in .NET projects to embrace implementing them 
into projects and to keep developers constantly on guard about cyber threats.  
The agenda for the education was following: 
Security model 
Threat modeling 
Hosting and security testing 
Security controls in Continuous integration 
Other tools 
In the security model phase confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and 
non-repudiation were introduced alongside onion model of defense in depth.  
In threat modeling problem domain was introduced alongside Microsoft Secure de-
velopment lifecycle. This introduced the personnel how to identify assets, how to 
model security architecture of the project, how to decompose the application and 
how to identify, document and rate the threats found.   
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After thread modeling it was introduced how the onion model of the defense in 
depth is linked to the projects under study and how hackers plan their attacks 
against web applications. Also OWASP testing guide 4.0 was introduced.  
From the initial theory a transform to actual security controls was made and each of 
the security controls introduced in this thesis was explained on an equal level that is 
presented in this thesis.  
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Retrospective questionnaire 
After educating the personnel briefly about the security controls studied in this thesis 
another questionnaire was given to the project teams to reflect the feelings about 
how the projects would benefit from the new knowledge. The answers to the ques-
tionnaire can be found in Appendix 2.  
7.2 Main results 
The results about the usefulness of different CI tools are presented in the chart be-
low.  
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Figure 20 - Usefulness of different tools 
It was clear that FxCop was a winner here due to introduction of an easy way to 
make code quality checks in code. It was a little surprising that the shared first place 
was taken up by jMeter. After jMeter there were few other static code analysis tools. 
In the bottom places were all the other tools that especially focused on security con-
cerns. OWASP Zed Attack Proxy, Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer, Nessus and 
Microsoft Attack Surface Analyzer got all relatively even scores. The personnel felt 
that all the tools would give some benefit since the lowest score from zero to five 
grade was two.  
This was positive feedback since it seems that although some tools were rated above 
others still all the tools were felt to be useful in some points.  
Based on open questions there are few things that have to be done more in the pro-
jects. Secure development lifecycle has to be brought earlier to projects to make sure 
that security is thought of in all stages of development, not only from the develop-
ment to maintenance. Especially threat modeling would be a good addition for devel-
opers to truly understand what the software is protected from.  
Main result of the study was that having a different kind of security controls in con-
tinuous integration is a good idea since they test different things. Software develop-
ers in the example projects were more likely to welcome performance and code 
quality oriented tools than actual security scanners. It is most likely operations that 
0
1
2
3
4
5
Usefulness of tools
Average Project 1 Project 2
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are more interested in security scanners than software developers. This is where 
DevOps is needed to build the bridge between operations and development so that 
there will be no gap in this area at the continuous integration.  
7.3 Critics 
The first questionnaire was created to be numerical to get as much attention as pos-
sible from the projects with the principle “fast to response”. Nevertheless, the 
amount of responses was depressing. Assumptions about answers were overesti-
mated and a different more detailed approach might have been more generous from 
the study perspective.  
Another fact that might have been better was the timing. It would have been better 
to make the projects implement all the CI controls – not just the questionnaire with 
their feelings about them. Lack of time in projects made this hard and it was decided 
to just educate the personnel and make the questionnaire based on the training ma-
terial and the education.  
Focusing on the Microsoft environment and tools that are as native as possible left 
out plenty of tools that might or might not have been useful. There were also plenty 
of commercial products that were left out for the same reasons. 
Another issue that was not perfect is that the ReSharper command line tools were 
added afterwards, and thus they are not included in the results, questionnaire and 
many of the tables above. It was felt to be useful information still, and thus it was 
added later on. Nevertheless, it was preliminarily integrated also in SonarQube 
study.  
7.4 Proposal for further research 
In the further research there are multiple ways to further study the subject. By leav-
ing Microsoft environment and taking into account commercial products there would 
be a huge deal of security controls to study. Many of the security products are for 
Linux environments, and actually there is even a Linux distribution named Kali that 
focuses on delivering security testing tools to security testers.  
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More of web application scanners 
There are plenty of web application security scanners out there. Many interesting 
ones were left out. Burp suite and Acunetix, for example, had a costly licensing 
model. Tools like w3af, Nikto, Wikto and Skipfish might have been eligible but were 
left out for schedule reasons. OWASP ZAP were the only one present from this cate-
gory and a further analysis could be conducted with different web application scan-
ners although many of these have been designed to be from Linux machines. Skip-
fish, for example, needs Cygwin in Windows to work and administrators might not be 
happy to contaminate their build server with tools like that.  
More of vulnerability scanners 
Vulnerability scanners like Nessus, QualysGuard, OpenVAS, Nexpose and Nmap are 
at their best at the network and host level scanning. Since in this scenario that part 
was nearly entirely left out these tools got only next to nothing attention. There 
might be more tools for continuous security than continuous integration or continu-
ous delivery. Nevertheless in different scenarios these tools can help out. 
Mittn and Gauntlt 
Mittn and Gauntlt are both behavior-driven development (BDD) process tools. BDD 
has emerged from test-driven development (TDD). This whole approach BDD ap-
proach would be an interesting study subject as well as its comparison to other ap-
proaches.  
Configuration analysis with Microsoft Web Application Configuration Analyzer 
The tool looked promising; however, lacked a command line tool. It might be possi-
ble to integrate this to CI build by either extracting logic from DLLs or by implement-
ing a graphical user interface robot.   
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 – Continuous security quoestionare 
Question Project 1 Project 2 
Security overall questions (0-5)     
Has there been security testing in project? (0 = no, 5 = deeply 
tested by various parties) 0 3 
Is there guide for secure development for developers (0 = no, 5 
= well documented guide) 0 0 
Does all the project developers know OWASP TOP 10 vulnera-
bilities (0 = no, 5 deep understanding) 1 1 
Does all the project developers know counter measures for 
OWASP TOP 10 vulnerabilities (0 = no, 5 = deep understanding 
and experience of protecting software) 1 1 
Web application security testing questions (y/n)     
Has there been any web application security scanning software 
in use? (if there has been then what was it?) n y 
Has the scanning results been studied together? n n 
Is there any web application security scanning in CI pipeline? n n 
Has there been any static code analyses in project? (if there has 
been, then what was it?) n y 
Is there any static code analysis in CI pipeline? n n 
Security testing questions (y/n)     
Are the servers on our responsibility? n n 
Has there been any hardening on our servers? n/a n/a 
Has there been any security scanning that has verified the hard-
ening? n/a n/a 
Is security scanning done frequently? n/a n/a 
Overview questions (0-5)     
How strict requirements there are for security? (0 = internal 
homepage on my own computer, 5 = bank system)  1 4 
What would be grade for projects security? (0 = no security 
testing, 5 = we know our threats and there are security controls 
to mitigate them) 3 1 
What would be grade for projects security testing automation 
level? (0 = there is none, 5 = I wouldn’t add anything) 0 1 
How well project security fits into customers security policy (0 = 
don’t know, 5 = we have went this through and there is no 
loose ends) 0 4 
Feel questions (0-5)     
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How much security testing should be considered in your pro-
ject? (0 = no need, 5 = we are under cyber-attack) 3 4 
Would you like to have security controls in CI pipeline in your 
project (0 = no, 5 = we are under cyber-attack) 0 3 
 
APPENDIX 2 – Retrospective quoestionare 
Question Project 1 Project 2 
Security control questions (0-5)     
How useful would FxCop be in CI pipeline in your pro-
ject? 4 5 
How useful would VCG be in CI pipeline in your project? 
2 5 
How useful would SonarQube be in CI pipeline in your 
project? 5 2 
How useful would Code Metrics be in CI pipeline in your 
project? 4 2 
How useful would OWASP ZAP be in CI pipeline in your 
project? 2 3 
How useful would MBSA be in CI pipeline in your pro-
ject? 2 3 
How useful would ASA be in CI pipeline in your project? 
1 3 
How useful would Nessus be in CI pipeline in your pro-
ject? 2 3 
How useful would jMeter be in CI pipeline in your pro-
ject? 4 5 
Education questions (0-5)     
Did you learn new things in thesis presentation? 
4 1 
Do you understand threat modeling? 
4 4 
How useful it is to have constant OWASP TOP 10 educa-
tion? 4 5 
Do you understand defense in depth? 
0 3 
How important you think is to implement these controls 
to CI? 2 3 
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Open questions – Project 1 
What was useful in the education materia? 
Compiling and explaining the different testing tools was very useful. Security threat 
model isn't anything that special, but good to keep in mind and refresh. Visualizing it 
is good. 
How did the material change your thinking about security testing? 
That we should do it more, if we can convince the customer to pay for it   
How would you change security testing in your current project? 
I think our assets should analyzed. We should at least try FxCop and those code com-
plexity tools (even if they're not very much related to security IMO) 
How did the material change your thinking about threats your project is meet-
ing? 
That with some small efforts there can be significant benefit.  
What would you do differently if you were to start a new project now? 
Depends on the project really. All of these tools can already be used in existing pro-
ject.  
What would you like to know more about? 
You said SonarQube is pretty complicated to configure, so I hope there will be more 
tutorial about this. 
Open questions – Project 2 
What was useful in the education material? 
It provided valuable training to Solita, which is also incidentally the first part of exe-
cuting what is the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle. https://www.mi-
crosoft.com/en-us/sdl/ 
I would like to see Solita establish a baseline secure way of software development, so 
that security isn’t first thought about when the software is already halfway done. 
I would follow the Microsoft SDL process closely to achieve this, and I think the 
presentation looks to be a good starting point towards that goal. 
How did the material change your thinking about security testing? 
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It didn’t, I was already familiar with the concepts provided in the material and have 
experience with many of the tools mentioned. It reminded me that we are so incredi-
bly lackluster in this aspect as a team. 
How would you change security testing in your current project? 
I would like to have established a CI environment which I could trust to check my im-
plementation for most of the common points of security and code analysis. I would 
also have liked to see a clear set of requirements in terms of security for the project 
and an analysis on what are the most security critical aspects of the application. 
How did the material change your thinking about threats your project is meet-
ing? 
I wouldn’t say it changed much, but more reminded me that customers never want to 
pay for security – it is something that must be provided by us to every project de facto, 
and it should be part of the original price. It isn’t an afterthought but it must be built 
in. The customer’s business doesn’t rely on it, but ours does because if anything goes 
wrong – we will be blamed and will stand to lose the most if that happens. 
What would you do differently if you were told to start a new project now? 
Keeping strictly on the topic of security, I would make sure to actively have a set of 
tools to test the solution in the CI pipeline. I would also be louder about the security 
implications of architectural decisions that were made incorrectly or with callous dis-
regard to security. 
What would you like to know more about? 
Attack vectors are always useful to know about, because they actively make a pro-
grammer more able to see the implications of their implementation. 
 
